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BOOK REVIEWS
CASES AND MATERIALS ON ADMINISTRATIvE LAW. By Kenneth C. Sears. St. Paul,
Minnesota: West Publishing Company. 1938. pp. xvi, 800. $6.00.
If reminder were needed of the fact that Administrative Law in this country is
rapidly coming of age, none could be more persuasive than the appearance within
the past two years of three new casebooks in the field. In 1911 the pioneer,
'Professor Ernst Freund, was obliged to draw heavily on Constitutional Law to
fill out the contours of the first Administrative Law casebook. By 1928 the infant
had attained an adolescence necessitating radical adjustments in its outfitting, and
this need was filled by the second edition of Freund's work. His monopoly of the
field was challenged for the first time by the appearance of the behemoth casebook
of Professors Frankfurter and Davison in 1932, reappearing in shockingly shrunken
proportions in 1935. In the late summer of 1937 Professors Maurer and Stason
put their respective entries into the field, and now, a year afterwards, we find
still another starter at the barrier.
In 1932 Professor Freund responded to the dedication to him of the work of
Professors Frankfurter and Davison with a posthumous review characterizing the
plan of the new casebook as breaking "the old tradition completely." 1  The real
force of the observation lay in the fact that the reviewer had almost (to note
Freund's own acknowledgment of the influence upon him of the work of Goodnow)
single-handedly been the architect of the old tradition. In its concentration on the
separation of powers and related problems the Work of Frankfurter and Davison
seemed to deny the subject the independent footing Freund had sought to give it,
and returned it to the apron strings of the parent Constitutional Law. Freund
denied himself the privilege of forecasting which theory ultimately would prevail,
but it cannot be doubted that his conviction of the subject's self-sufficiency had
not been shaken seriously. Indeed, the authors of the new casebook projected their
theory as a somewhat provisional one,2 and the changes wrought but three years
later in their second editions were eloquent acknowledgment of the merit of Freund's
mildly-voiced doubtings. Vindication of Freund's sponsorship of the independence
of the subject is now finally established in the unanimity with which his viewpoint
is accepted by the authors of the three latest casebooks in the field.
The prefatory statement tells us that Professor Sears' original intention was the
production of a third edition of Freund's work, but that this plan was abandoned
in favor of projecting a "new book that must be judged by its own contents."'4
1. Freund, Book Review (1932) 46 HARv. L. REV. 167, 170.
2. "Even a casebook must be organized by some concepts and reflect some attempt
at systematization, however tentative. But it is idle to pretend that this collection does
more than adumbrate the considerations that underlie the creation of administrative bodies,
the sphere of their respective activities, the different procedures to which they are subject,
the boundaries of their discretion, and the standards which courts invoke In scrutinizing
such discretion." FRA xruRTER AND DAviso, CASES ON Am rs A=IvE LAW (1st ed.
1932) viii.
3. The second edition reduced the number of British cases from thirty In the first
edition to five in the second; state decisions were likewise reduced from a total of eighteen
in the first edition to but three in the second. The second edition's analysis of the subject
still savored strongly of the flavor of Constitutional Law, however.
4. SEARS. CAsEs ON A Y.rNISTRATrv LAW (1938) vii.
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At the same time the author acknowledgesu that he has been influenced in the
preparation of this new work by two ideas expressed by Freund in the Introduction
to his second edition: "Administrative Law continues to be treated as law control-
ling the administration, and not as law produced by the administration," and "An
effort has been made to relieve the course as far as possible of constitutional
problems, which are taken care of in other courses."'7 Both propositions dominate
the plan and structure of Professor Sears' book.
The first chapter is devoted to the most elaborate treatment of the so-called
extraordinary legal remedies, habeas corpus, prohibition, quo warranto, certiorari,
and mandamus, yet presented in casebook form. It is to be doubted if the most
generous concession of the importance of these remedies entitles them to such
liberality of treatment-in addition to that received incidentally in other connections;
as, for example, with habeas corpus in the cases devoted to immigration, and with
several of the other remedies in the cases on the removal and control of officers
charged with administrative responsibilities. The vastly more important remedy
of the injunction in both its aspects (prohibitory or preventive, and mandatory) is
entitled to the sixty-odd pages of consideration devoted to it, notwithstanding it,
independent treatment in courses on equity; and the growing importance of declara-
tory relief would seem to have a more easily justified demand for relaxation of
spatial limitations than such matters as, let us say, prohibition. Most difficult to
understand is the omission of the statutory appeal from this chapter on remedies..
Granting that some opportunity for discussion of the subject is afforded later in
the chapter devoted to representative agencies, the stress laid on the remedial
aspects of the subject not merely would justify, but would seem to demand, an inde-
pendent treatment of the statutory appeal. The remedy needs a place as near the
treatment of the injunction as possible in view of the injunction's use as the mo3t
frequently appointed method of statutory appeal, and, in the light of the recent
decisions of the United States Supreme Court in the cases of Utah Fuel Co. v.
National Bituminous Coal Commissions and Shields v. Utah Idaho Central R.R.
Co.'9 for the sake of contrasting the availability of the injunction with that of
the appeal allowed by statute. At this point, too, the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies as a condition of the availability of other remedies has
a legitimate claim to specific recognition.' 0
It is in the second chapter that the two ideas ascribed to Freund come mozt
prominently into play. The contents of this chapter (107 pages) embrace the essence
5. Ibid.
6. FRnu--N, CASES o-z A sLmDxisTrnTnVE LAw (2d ed. 1923) v.
7. Ibid.
S. 59 Sup. Ct. 409 (Jan. 30, 1939).
9. 59 Sup. Ct. 160 (Dec. 5, 193S).
10. The cases on the remedial aspects of the subject are presented in the first section
only tentatively. The author expresses the belief (Preface, vii) that the sooner the
student is given some understanding of the mechanics by which the cases get into the
courts, the better will be his grasp of the substantive aspects of the subject. The qucstion
to be raised is whether the student will permit postponement of dilcussion of the rub-
stantive phases of the cases. It would seem to be as difficult to divorce the substantive
from the remedial as the converse is difficult, and if the divorcement be not made, much
precious time will be lost in repetition. The problem is something akin to that met in'
trying to teach equity through the medium of the maxims. Profes..ors Maurer and Staten,
in their casebooks, have preferred to postpone the dicussion of the remedial aspects until
after the treatment of the substantive, and this course Profesor Sears suggeAts (Preface,
viii) may, if desired, be followed without disadvantage in the use of his booh.
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of; the subject on whatever general substantive side may be conceded to it, as is
indicated by the heading: "The General Nature of Administrative Tribunals and
Agefcies-The Methods by Which They Function and Are Subjected to Judicial
Limitation." The treatment is completely non-analytical, no effort being made,
even in the table of contents, to skeletonize the subject-matter. Inevitably the
result is more or less amorphous. The complete abandonment of the cases dealing
with separation of powers will receive acquiescence, and even approval, where tile
course on Administrative Law comes after the course on Constitutional Law. Too
frequently, however, the courses are taught concurrently so that the one cannot
wait on the other for a discussion of the subject, and occasionally a student crops
Up who'has not had, and is not even currently exposed to, the course on Constitu-
tional Law. The emphasis lent to the matter by Frankfurter and Davison was
far too top-heavy for the ordinary course on Administrative Law, but some con-
sideration of the essential principles, albeit at the expense of repetition, still seems
desirable.
-Freund's second proposition, that administrative law is less a body of principles
produced by administration, and more a system of checks for the control of the
administrative process, has been accepted and followed by Professor Sears to an
extent that surpasses Freund's own conformity to the proposition. Heavy con-
centration on the remedial aspects of the subject has necessitated sketchier treat-
ment of other matters. There is no explicit recognition of the familiar distinguish-
ment of the administrative process into quasi-legislative, executive and quasi-
judicial functions. This breakdown, which is not merely formal, but substantive in
its consequences and implications, serves as the backbone of Maurer's and Stason's
analyses of the subject, as, indeed, it seems to be regarded by the courts them-
selves." While the inclusion of Commonwealth v. Sissot,12 Southern Ry. Co. v.
Virginia,'3 and Morgan v. United States14 afford convenient points of departure
for the establishment of the distinction by the instructor, the paucity of the cases,
and the lack of co-ordination among them, makes the burden of elaboration an
extremely heavy one. This observation is even more pertinent in respect of the
matter of judicial review. Here, more than any other place, analysis is indispensable.
The degree of finality that will be accorded the administrative determination will
vary not only with the type of subject-matter involved, but also according to the
nature of the function, whether quasi-legislative, executive, or quasi-judicial, being
exercised by the administrative body. For all his views of the subject as merely
a congeries of checks on the administrative process, Freund recognized the necessity
for analytical treatment of such matters as notice and hearing, administrative
discretion and administrative finality. His analysis of the last mentioned topic,
appearing in the 1928 edition of his casebook, was penetrating enough in its initial
construction to remain still pertinent today, and its sacrifice without some replace-
ment is to be regretted.
Short shrifted as it seems, the treatment accorded the problem of administrative
finality is extravagant compared with that afforded such matters as the licensing
and rule making powers, matters hardly to be written off as of little significance
at any time, but today looming with a greater importance than ever before. Pro-
fessor Freund's omission of administrative regulations, and problems connected
11. Compare, for example, Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States, 288
U. S. 294 (1933), with Pacific States Basket Co. v. White, 296 U. S. 176 (1935).
12. 189 Mass. 247,'75 N. E. 619 (1905).
13. 290 U. S. 190 (1933).
14. 298 U. S. 469 (1936); 304 U. S. 1 (1938); 304 U. S. 23 (1938).
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therewith, was justified at the time of his second edition (1928) on the ground
that "the case material is inadequate for . . . proper understanding."1u Mluch
water has run under the dam since that statement was made, and some attention,
however groping and experimental, must be accorded the rule making power and
limitations thereon. To some extent Professor Sears recognizes this necessity by
devoting an appendix of twenty pages to the Rules and Regulations issued by the
Department of Agriculture under the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act.1 G
His choice of this particular administrative activity was a singularly happy one in
view of the neat blending of quasi-legislative, executive and quasi-judicial functions
to he exercised by the Secretary of Agriculture under the authority of the Act.
Cases have been included in another part of the book1 7 illustrating the performance
of the quasi-judicial function under this Act, and had there been included excerpts
from the statute itself, juxtaposed in close conjunction with the regulations, striking
illustration might be made of the way in which the so-called interpretive (quasi-
legislative) function operates.
Through the strictly functional approach afforded by this instance and others
offered in the sections of the third chapter dealing with "Examnples of Adminis-
trative Tribunals and Agencies in Operation," it may be altogether possible to bring
into clear focus the material dealt with in the second chapter. Grants of adminis-
trative discretion are illustrated by a section of twenty-two pages devoted to
"Health and Morals." Some phases of notice and hearing requirements are exem-
plified by eighty-two pages of cases dealing with taxation. The section on "Immi-
gration" presents another phase of the subject in some well selected cases (28 pages).
Workmen's Compensation is treated in three cases from the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin and ten pages of excerpts from law review articles. The section headed
"Utilities" is made up of an interesting selection of seven decisions of the Inter-
state Commerce Commission, excerpts from Sharfman's work on the Commission,
two United States Supreme Court decisions, and one case apiece from the highest
courts of Wisconsin and Illinois and the old Circuit Court for the Southern District
of New York-all dealing with railroad carriers. The Civil Service is accorded
treatment in twenty-two pages and the Federal Trade Commission in sixteen.18
The National Labor Relations Board is recognized through the medium of the
Consolidated Edison case, as decided in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals,10
and two other cases, one from the Fifth Circuit and the second from a district
court. Cursory comment is offered on the Securities and Exchange Commission,
Agriculture, the Communications Commission, the Postal Service and "Miscellaneous
Licenses" in a total of seven pages.
A fourth chapter, dealing with the selection, removal and responsibility of officers,
and a final chapter devoted to the responsibility of governments, local, state and
federal, both conventional in treatment, conclude the book. Especially to be noted
15. FRE-ND, CAsEs ox Agmsas vw LAw (2d ed. 1928) vi.
16. 46 STAT. 531 (1930), as amended by 48 SmTA. 584 (1934), and So SrTr. 725 (1937);
7 U. S. C. § 499 (a) et seq. (1930). Appendix 4, pp. 769-789.
17. Pp. 524-538.
18. No Supreme Court decisions involving the Federal Trade Comm.idon are included
in this section. However, the case of Federal Trade Commiisson v. American Tobacco
Co., 264 U. S. 298 (1924) is included in Chapter 2 (p. 284), to illustrate (suppo.edly)
the power of the administrative body to acquire evidence necesmry as a basis of adminis-
trative action.
19. Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 95 F. (2d) 390 (C. C. A.
2d, 1938).
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is an appendix of thirty pages reproducing the "Working Papers on Administrative
Adjudication," of Dr. Frederick F. Blachly of the Brooking Institution. Professor
Sears has performed a valuable service in making these exceptional materials readily
available for the student.
Tritely true in every instance, but particularly true in the case of a work so
devoted to the functional point of view as is Professor Sears', the principal im.
portance of a casebook is to be, found in the cases. The author's analysis of the
subject-matter, his plan of presentation, his inclusion of this problem at one point,
and his exclusion of that one at another, will challenge criticism as long as casebooks
are written. That will indeed be the milennium when a casebook is written against
which no quibble can be raised. In this belief a comparison is offered of Professor
Sears' casebook with the others in the field. The tabulation that follows, while
far from exact, is believed to carry sufficient accuracy to afford reasonably reliable
comparisons. 20
1. Total Pages
2. Textual Matter
3. Statutory Matter
4. Administrative
Matter
5. British Cases
6. Cases from U. S.
Sup. Ct.
7. Cases from Lower
Fed. Cts.
8. State Cases
9. Total States
Represented
10. Total Cases
11. Total Pages
of Cases
12. Average Case
Length
20. In the tabulation the total
FRANK- FRANK-
FURTER, FURTER,
STASON
745
67
65
MAURER
589
49
9
DAVI-
SON,
2d Ed.
643
53
4
DAVI-
SON,
ist Ed.
1,150
90
4
FREUND FREUND
2d Ed. Ist Ed.
734 667
14 8
20 7
33 10 x x x x
x x 5 30 29 18
SEARS
789
105
4
75
x
48 61 81 71 111 60 50
26 15 18 4 12 13 8
98 57 20 3 18 115 140
3 7 27
83 171 217
30 19 8
178 133 119
605 580 521 586 1,056 700 652
3.4 4.36 4.37
pages indicated
7 6 3.2 3
is exclusive ot pages devoted to such
matters as indices, bibliographies, etc. Material appearing in footnotes has not been
considered in the summarization. What has been referred to as textual matter embraces
not merely the author's own statements (set forth in the body, as distinguished from the
footnotes), but also quotations from treatises, periodicals, debates, reports, etc. Statutory
matter connotes direct quotations from legislative enactments. Administrative matter
refers chiefly to rules and regulations. By way of comment on the case materials, deci-
sions from the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia appear more frequently
than do decisions of any federal court other than the United States Supreme Court, yet
the degree of incidence is not as high as it might be (a total of 16 cases, of which 6
are reported by Professor Sears) considering the present and rapidly growing Importance
of that court in the field of administrative law. Among the state courts whose decisions
are reported, New York appears most frequently (a total of 98 cases, of which 19 appear
in Professor Sears' casebook), with Illinois second (a total of 83 cases, of which 14
[Vol. 8
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It will be noted that there is a heavy preponderance of state cases in the books
of Professors Sears and Freund, while those of Professor Maurer and Professors
Frankfurter and Davison indicate a strong preference for the decisions of the
United States Supreme Court. Professor Stason's casebook is nearly dhided
between the two. A penchant for the decisions of the English courts is shared only
by Professor Freund and Professors Frankfurter and Davison. It may be of inter-
est to note the proportions in which statutory materials are included. Professor
Stason, for example, devotes sixty-five pages principally to the Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act,2' the Communications Act of 1934i- and
the Federal Register Act.2- The limited treatment accorded the legislative materials
by Professor Sears accords more or less with the policy of the other authors, except
that Professor Freund, whose second edition included twenty pages of excerpts from
statutes, recommends in his prefatory statement that in conjunction vth the case-
book use be made "of his Administrative Powers over Persons and Property, giving
"an entirely different approach to the subject . . . , showing that legislation has
been an even more important factor in its development than the decisions of the
courts.2 4 The textual excerpts consist chiefly of selections from treatises and law
reviews except that in the case of Professor Stason's work the text materials are
made up almost exclusively of the author's own summarizations, a characteristic
also, on a somewhat lesser scale, of Professor laurer's casebook.
It may not be amiss to add a final remark that the degree of duplication to be
found in the casebooks of Professors Sears, Stason and Maurer is slight. "Thirteen
cases included in Professor Sears' book (that is, cases reported as a part of the
text; cases referred to in the footnotes have not been considered) are also to be
found in that of Professor Stason,25 and of these six coincide with the selections
of Professor Maurer.20 The much discussed Morgan case,27 which had not gone
appear in Professor Sears' casebook), and Massachusetts third (a total of 42 cases, of
which 7 appear in Professor Sears' ca-ebook).
21. 44 STAT. 1424; 33 U. S. C. § 901 et seq. (1927).
22. 48 STAT. 1064; 47 U. S. C. § 151 et seq. (1934).
23. 49 STAr. 500; 44 U. S. C. A. § 301 et seq. (Supp. 1935).
24. FR -D, CAsEs oN A m=asra rnT L.W (2d ed. 1928) vi,
25. Commonwealth v. Sisson, IS9 Mass. 247, 75 N. E. 619 (1905 |; Farmers' Elevator
Co. v. Chi., R. 1. & P. R. Co., 266 IMI. 567, 107 N. E. 841 (1915); Firt Nat. Bank v.
Board of Com'rs., 264 U. S. 450 (1924); Humphrey's E-'r v. United States, 295 U. S. C92
(1935); Langenberg v. Decker, 131 Ind. 471, 31 N. E. 190 (1892); Lowe v. Conroy, 120
Wis. 151, 97 N. W. 942 (1904); Morgan v. United States, 293 U. S. 463 (1935); North
American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U. S. 305 (1909); Ohio Valley Water Co. V.
Ben Avon Borough, 253 U. S. 2S7 (1920); Smith v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 270
U. S. 587 (1926); Southern Ry. Co. v. Virginia, 290 U. S. 190 (1933); Speed v. Common
Council, 98 Mich, 360, 57 N. W. 405 (1G94); State ex rel. Wisconsin Inspection Bizeaa
v. Whitman, 196 Wis. 472, 220 N. W. 929 (1923). The cases in italics indicate the cases
which also appear in Professor Maurer's casebook.
26. See the italicized cases in footnote 25. The three following cass also appear
in the casebooks of Professors Sears and Maurer, but do not appear in that of Profezor
Stason: Interstate Commerce Commison v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 227 U. S.
88 (1913); Pantages (Pantazes) v. Hays, 15 F. Supp. 1053 (N. D. Iowa, 1936); United
States v. Abilene & Southern R. Co., 265 U. S. 274 (1924).
27. Morgan v. United States, 298 U. S. 46S (1936); 304 U. S. 1 (1938); 304 U. S.
23 (1938).
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far beyond the decision of the United States Supreme Court in 1936,28 when the
casebooks of Professors Maurer and Stason appeared in 1937, is, naturally, reported
only to that extent by them, but the two decisions by the Supreme Court in 1938,",
as well as the intermediate District Court decision in 1937,30 have also been in-
cluded by Professor Sears. On the other hand, while all three casebooks carry
the Ben Avon Borough case,31 Professor Sears has chosen not to follow the suit
of Professors Maurer and Stason in the reporting of Crowell v. Bensono2 and the
St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. case.33
The degree of coincidence in the selections of Professor Sears and Freund is much
higher. Forty-two cases appearing in Freund's second edition have been carried
over into the casebook of Professor Sears, 34 of which nineteen had previously ap-
28. Morgan v. United States, 298 U. S. 468 (1936).
29. Morgan v. United States, 304 U. S. 1 (1938), and, on rehearing, 304 U. S. 23 (1938).
30. Morgan v. United States, 23 F. Supp. 380 (W. D. Mo., 1937).
31. Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U. S. 287 (1920).
32. 285 U. S. 22 (1932). The case is discussed in a footnote in Professor Sears' book
(at page 311).
33. St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U. S. 38 (1936). This case Is
also given footnote discussion by Professor Sears (at page 306).
34. Amy v. Supervisors, 11 Wall. 136 (1870); Attorney General v. Mayor of North-
ampton, 143 Mass. 589, 10 N. E. 450 (1887); Auffrnordt v. Hedden, 137 U. S. 310 (1890) ;
Ball v. Pattridge, I Sid. 296 (1666); Chew Hoy Quong v. White, 249 Fed. 869 (C. C. A.
9th, 1918); Chi. & N. W. Ry. Co. v. R. R. Comm., 156 Wis. 47, 145 N. W. 216 (1914);
Earl and Wilson v. Raymond, 188 Ill. 15, 59 N. E. 19 (1900); Farmers' Elevator Co. v.
Chi., R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 266 Ill. 567, 107 N. E. 841 (1915); Federal Trade Commision
v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U. S. 298 (1924); Fire Dept. of City of N. Y. v. Gilmour,
149 N. Y. 453, 44 N. E. 177 (1896); Hagar v. Aceclamation District, 111 U. S. 701 (1884);
Hatfield v. Graham, 73 W. Va. 759, 81 S. E. 533 (1914); Ill. Bell Tel. Co. v. Commerce
Commission, 306 Ill. 109, 137 N. E. 449 (1922); 1. C. C. v. Brimson, 154 U. S. 447
(1895); I. C. C. v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 227 U. S. 88 (1913); Keenan v.
Southworth, 110 Mass. 474 (1872); Kuntz v. Stmption, 117 Ind. 1, 19 N. E. 474
(1889); Langenberg v. Decker, 131 Ind. 471, 31 N. E. 190 (1892); Langlord v. United'
States, 101 U. S. 341 (1879); Lowe v. Conroy, 120 Wis. 151, 97 N. W. 942 (1904);
McCord v. High, 24 Iowa 336 (1868); Mostyn v. Fabrigas, Cowp. 161 (1774); North
American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U. S. 306 (1908); Ohio Valley Water Co.
v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U. S. 287 (1920); People ex rel. Bailey v. Supervisors, 12
Barb. (N. Y.) 217 (1851); People ex rel. Cook v. Board of Police, 39 N. Y. 506 (1868);
People ex rel. Drake v. Regents of Univ. of Mich., 4 Mich. 98 (1856); Pittsburgh, C., C.
& St. L. R. Co. v. Backus, 154 U. S. 421 (1894); Rex v. Inhabitants-in Glamorgan-
shire, 1 Ld. Raym. 580 (1700); Roux v. Commissioner, 203 Fed. 413 (C. C. A. 9th,
1913); Smith v. Foster, 15 F. (2d) 115 (S. D. N. Y. 1926); Smith v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co.,
270 U. S. 587 (1925); State v. Evans, 3 Ark. 585 (1841); State of Georgia v. Stanton,
6 Wall. 50 (1867); State ex rel. Cothren v. Lean, 9 Wis. 279 (1859); Tolman v. Salomon,
191 Ill. 202, 60 N. E. 809 (1901); United States v. Abilene & So. Ry. Co., 265 U. S.
274 (1913); United States v. Great Falls Mfg. Co., 112 U. S. 645 (1884); United States.
ex rel. Tisi v. Tod, 264 U. S. 131 (1924); Warne v. Vartey, 6 Term Rep. (Dunford and
East) 443 (1795); Wheeler v. Patterson, 1 N. H. 88 (1817); Wilson v. Bowers, 14 F.
(2d) 976 (S. D. N. Y. 1924). The cases italicized indicate cases appearing in the first
as well as the second edition of FREUND's CASES ON AimusTRa'TvE LAW.
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peared in the first edition of Freund's work, thus representing survivals of a test
of nearly thirty years of teaching.35 Several of these latter also appear in the
casebooks of Professors Stason and Maurer.30
This slight degree of duplication in case materials, and the widely varying analyses
and treatments of the subject matter afford the most convincing demonstration of
the tremendously broad and rapid development of administrative law in this country.
Despite the fact that there are now five (and six, if the first edition of Frankfurter
and Davison is included) casebooks in the field of selection, there is no over-
crowding. Each has made its own particular contribution, all, of course, coming
after Freund, and all building on the foundation he laid so well.
FnACs C. NASHt
CASES AND OTHER MATERA LS ON JuDIcLmr REmDIES. By Austin W. Scott and
Sidney P. Simpson. Cambridge: Published by the Editors. 1938. pp. xi, 1309.
$7.00.
When competent and experienced scholars turn their hands to casebook editing,
the product is fairly sure to be so scholastically and technically impeccable that the
only thing left for the reviewer to do is to discuss his own pedagogical preconcep-
tions. That, I believe, is the present situation, or at least I like to think so. As
previous experience has shown, the editors can be depended upon for careful work-
manship and a collection of cases and other material all fully annotated and docu-
mented. The present casebook is no exception. This voluminous work is a mine
of trustworthy information on procedural materials, useful no less to the practicing
lawyer and judge, as to the student and teacher. It deserves the high place it will
undoubtedly assume as a source book of procedural law. So let us turn to the
teaching ideas which it supports and illustrates.
It can be demonstrated, I believe, that the general field of civil pleading and
procedure is the one field which the Harvard Law School over the years has failed
to treat in the grand manner, and that this omission has had profound effects in
making our law administration-until recently technical, particularistic, and back-
ward. True, Ames, as a part of a busy career, turned his attention to pleading and
made a sound start in organizing materials in a single and general synthesis, rather
than in the disparate segments which still seems to be a usual practice. But the Vork
was not carried on from this substantial, if overhistorical, beginning in such a way
as to develop a great master comparable to, say, Thayer in the field of evidence, or
to affect profoundly both the future teaching and the case law of the subject. After
various vicissitudes the initial procedural work at Harvard came to be a first-year
35. See the italicized cases in footnote 34. Also appearing in Freund's first edition,
and reappearing in Professor Sears' casebook is Commonwealth v. Kinsley, 133 Mass. 578
(1882). In Freund's second edition the Kinsley case is merely cited by way of a footnote
reference (p. 188).
36. Lowe v. Conroy and Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, both italicized
in note 25, supra, are to be found in the casebooks of Professors Stason and Maurer.
Also to be found in the casebook of Professor Stason (of the cases italicized in footnote
34, supra) are Langenberg v. Decker; North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, and
Smith v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co. And also to be found in the casebook of Professor Maurer
(of the cases in footnote 34, supra) are I. C. C. v. LouisvKle & Nashville R. Co., and
United States v. Abilene & So. Ry. Co.
t Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law School.
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course which it seems fair to characterize as a brief historical survey of the field.
This is now to be superseded by, or, as I view it, expanded into, the course sub-
tended by this volume.
The further point that this limited conception of the subject has had a definitely
deleterious effect upon law administration in this country is obviously more difficult
to establish. We do know, however, how certain subjects such as evidence were pro-
foundly affected by the Harvard teaching, and we do know that civil procedure was
long the forgotten subject of both law schools and courts. I mean, of course, that
there was assumed to be no general philosophy of the subject deserving of study in
school or of application in judicial decision; of technical rulings of vocafional instruc-
tion there was no end. It almost seemed to be an axiom that the abler the court,
the more it frowned upon and slighted procedural issues. Had this resulted in sub-
ordinating pleading to be "a handmaid," not "the mistress" of justice, of making it
clearly not an end in itself, but only a means, we should all have rejoiced. Unfortu-
nately it actually had just the opposite result. As is well known, procedural history
shaped our substantive law, and it seems impossible to get rid of supposed obstacles
presented by this history by ignoring them. Moreover, a decision motivated by "fire.
side equities" is often rationalized in terms of procedural demands, to the destruc-
tion of a sound philosophy of adjective law, whatever may be the result in the
particular case. Experience is clear that only by having knowledge and taking thought
as to objectives may pleading and procedure be regulated to its proper subordinate
position. And this has not been done in the past.
Nevertheless there has now developed a new spirit. The law schools have become
increasingly aware of the truism that knowledge means power in the field of law
administration as elsewhere, and now the lawyers and the judges are coming to the
same view. The crowning proof of this new attitude is the adoption of the new
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and their enthusiastic approval by'the bench and
bar. Here is now a marvelous opportunity for an adequate national and philosophical,
as distinguished from local and vocational, study of this subject. This our authors
properly recognize, albeit with an appropriate Bostonian rating of relative importance,
for they say that "by a fortunate coincidence, the new curriculum of the Harvard
Law School is going into effect at the same time as" the new Federal Rules.1 Such
recognition is to be commended, even if one feels that the pedagogical change it im-
plies has not been extensive.
For after all, this book, valuable as it is as a reference source, seems but an ex-
pansion of Professor Scott's earlier casebook presenting an historical survey of the
field of Remedies. True, it is stated that the more detailed study of civil procedure
is reserved for the third year, and the current Harvard catalogue tentatively an-
nounces a year course in "Pleading and Practice" of two hours a week. I do not
know what is proposed as the content of this course. Nevertheless, I venture to be-
lieve that if it covers much the same ground as this course in Judicial Remedies, it
is a duplication of work after an unfortunate emphasis has been given in the first
year; while if it covers new ground, it must take up relatively unimportant matters.
From any point of view this course as here outlined must take the cream of the
subject.
Now, to say that this course approaches the subject in the wrong way because it
is at once a running history and a bird's-eye view is not to say that we do not need
1. May a mere outsider wonder at the apparent tremors with which the new curriculum
is viewed at Harvard-witness Simpson. The New Curriculum of the Harvard Law School
(1938) 51 HARV. L. REv. 965--for it seems to reflect only the natural, non-violent changes
made necessary by a changing legal world?
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either history or completeness of survey. History is an essential for adequate kmowl-
edge of procedure. The difficulty comes when the history of the way we got where
we are is made to seem more important than where we are. History should be used
to explain the present, not to bring back the past. As it is, we are continually jerked
back and forth between the ancient and the modem law, so that it is difficult even
for an experienced person, not to speak of a first-year student, to realize where we
are or what century we are in at a given point. Thus, after we are given a realistic
approach to modem law by the full record in an important case-the famous Palsgraf
v. Long Island Railroad Co. 2 -we find ourselves flung in the midst of the common
law actions, and that, too, as though they were modem problems. Here, indeed, is
the statement of one problem (p. 96): "Suppose defendant wrongfully distrains
plaintiff's horse and refuses to return it after gage and pledge. Will trespass lie?"
And The Six Carpenters Case,3 decided in 1611, is indicated as giving the final answer.
Perhaps some of this switching back and forth between centuries is necessary,
but the matter becomes acute when the central point about which modem procedural
reform must turnm-the union of law and equity-is postponed to some sixty-five
pages near the close of this 1300-page book (pp. 1145-1210). (The history and the
survey of equity occupy the space from 693 to 1144.) To understand what the
modem pleading is, what has happened to the abolition of the forms of action, and
the substitution of one form of civil action, a study of this material, thus so sum-
marily treated, is absolutely essential. True, the problem is hinted at in various
places earlier, beginning perhaps at pages 146-167 on the abolition of the forms of
action, though this material is determinedly limited to non-equity cases. In lie
fashion the right to trial by jury appears at page 311, and trial without a jury and
waiver at page 479, but with pains to exclude the vitally important subject, without
which the problem cannot be understood, of trial of equitable issues (since the latter
was to be treated briefly and more or less by inference at pages 1192-1210). In-
stances showing this kaleidoscope occur continuously. Of course, it follows from the
plan which is to treat the subject by pictures, and not as one deserving of a phil-
osophy which must be erected by diligent study before details become important.
But query?
The character of the book as a survey emphasizes this method. Thus, we meet
the recent reform of the summary judgment (pp. 226-230) before we have had the
background of the long struggle for pleading reform in England and America and
the significance in that struggle of the code reform of pleading. Along in the middle
of the book we have a long section, considerably longer than that on the union of
law and equity, on extraordinary legal remedies, including "common law certiorari,"
prohibition, and habeas corpus (pp. 610-692). Even more substance is given to this
arrangement by the relative importance, referred to above, accorded to ancient equity
as compared to the modem fused procedure. The result, it is submitted, is to give a
definitely wrong emphasis to the whole subject, and a wrong background from which
to face the procedural problems of today. But vested interests in "equity" teaching
certainly yield slowly.
Though a philosophy is not explicit in this approach, perhaps one is implicit after
all. May not the fundamental question which the proposed course seems to me to
present be bottomed upon a lack of sympathy for the most important of modem
procedural reforms and a feeling that maybe Lord Coke in The Six CarpCntcrs Case
and the Lord Chancellors in the cases from 1393 on (pp. 749 et seq.) did have rather
the better of the modems? Unless there is complete accord with the thoroughgoing
2. 248 N. Y. 329, 162 N. E. 99 (1928).
3. 8 Co. 146b (1611)-
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reform achieved by the new Federal Rules, it is not likely that a course integrated
about them, using history to explain, but not control, them, will result. I had better
confess at once that my real concern is here. I should not like to see the develop.
ment of a truly national uniform system of simple law administration hampered by
the lagging steps of brilliant young men from Harvard who have been trained to be-
lieve that after all the past is best.4 And I believe no course in pleading and pro-
cedure is now worthy of the name unless it does teach that national system-which
the new Federal Rules offer-and in a grand way as having a philosophy and a
methodology of its own right comparable to any course in the school.
Perhaps these remarks are unduly querulous. After all, however, they are a
tribute to Harvard and to the authors, for they recognize the influence which a new
procedural course at Harvard will have on courts and schools. Of course, that does
not change the fact that the book itself has all the material any instructor needs,
so that he can, if he wishes, remould it so as to fashion a course in modern procedure.
CHARLES E. CLARKf
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF TORTS (Vol. 3). By the American Law Institute.
St. Paul: American Law Institute Publishers. 1938. pp. xxvi, 759. $6.00.
In 1913, at the request of the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teach-
ing, Dr. Josef Redlich, Professor of Law in the University of Vienna, made a careful
evaluation of the case method of study in American law schools. While in general
reporting favorably upon the value of the method Dr. Redlich made two suggestions
for its improvement. To quote from his report:
"It is characteristic of the case method that where it has thoroughly established
itself legal education has assumed the form of instruction almost exclusively through
analysis of separate cases. The result of this is that the students never obtain a
general picture of the law as a whole, not even a picture which includes only its
main features. This is, in my opinion, however, just as important for the study
of Anglo-American law as for the codified continental systems, and is a task which
should also be accomplished by the law courses in the universities. To this end, the
following seems to me above all things requisite:
"First, as an introduction to the entire curriculum, care should be taken to intro-
duce to the students, in elementary fashion, the fundamental concepts and legal
ideas that are common to all divisions of the common law .... The more rigorously
casuistic the case method of instruction which then follows necessarily has to be,
4. On page 1159 there is a suggestion, with reference to the Federal Rules, that "the
unification contemplated by these rules and by the statute under which they were pro-
mulgated thus appears to be procedural unification only, and so rather of the English than
of the New York type." I do not fully understand this, except that I am sure it must
be erroneous in its implications, at least. If it is that certain code reform, such as that of
New York, made substantive changes in the law of equity, that was never intended and
was not so in result. If, however, it is meant that the reform of the new rules is not
so complete as that of New York, that, too, is erroneous, as, indeed, the decisions are
already beginning to show. I have discussed this matter often and at length, e.g., (1936)
22 A. B. A. J. 447, 449; (1938) 23 WAst. U. L. Q. 297; (1938) 86 Prrsau.Ron LEo. J. 4,
28-31; (1939) 15 TE.. L. REv. 551 ; and the Proceedings at the A. B. A. Institutes in 1938,
Vol. I, p. 194, II, p. 236.
t Dean, Yale Law School.
[Vol. 8
BOOK REVIEWS
the more important it seems to me it is to make clear to the students at the very
beginning certain fundamental facts and guide-posts of the law which are removed
from all casuistry and theoretical controversy. . . . It seems to me very advisable
to add also at the end of the course lectures which shall furnish the American layw
student once more, before he steps out directly into practical legal life, a certain
general summing up and survey of the law.. . ..
In spite of Dr. Redlich's emphatic language, apparently nothing has been done by
the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching towards carrying out
either of Dr. Redlich's suggestions. Since 1923, however, the Carnegie Corporation
has been sponsoring and supporting the production and publication of text books of
a new kind under the general heading of the Restatement of the Law. Thus far
thirteen volumes have appeared, the latest one being Volume 3 of Torts, which, like
the other twelve volumes, has been creditably done within the purpose and scope
of the general enterprise. For although lacking the authority of either a statute
or judicial decision; though without the readableness or humanness of a well written
statute, decision or text of the common or garden variety; though giving no inkling
as to whether the rules laid down are well settled or merely the weight of authority,
or as to the exact process by which the various rules have been arrived at; though
doing very little toward correlating the various legal fields with each other; in spite
of all these handicaps the Restatement is valuable in furnishing to the reader--quot-
ing the Introduction, "the product of expert opinion and the expression of the law
by the legal profession".
Volume 3 of the Torts Restatement covers the subjects of Absolute Liability,
Deceit, Defamation, Disparagement (slander of title and trade libel), Unjustifiable
Litigation (malicious prosecution, wrongful institution of civil proceedings, abuse of
process), Interference in Domestic Relations and that part of Interference with
Business Relations which relates to trade practices. The subject of liability for
damage caused by non-defamatory statements, which is closely related to both deceit
and defamation, is apparently to be covered in a later volume. The only reference
to it is at the beginning of the division on Defamation.
Statements in the division on Deceit as to the liability for damage caused by
negligent representations and by representations of intention and of law accord with
what text writers and law teachers have usually contended was the better view; but
it would be of special value in these three sections to be furnished with a discussion
of the decisions upon which the statements were based. It is only partly reassuring
to be told in the Introduction that "the sections of the Restatement express the
result of a careful analysis of the subject and a thorough examination and discussion
of pertinent cases".
In § 569 in the division on Defamation the meaning of the phrase "actionable
per se" is explained, but there is apparently no explanation of the phrases which are
so likely to be confused with it, "libellous per se" and "slanderous per se", though
there is in § 563, an explanation of the related terms "colloquium" and "innuendo".
From the standpoint of the law student this omission seems unfortunate.
Now that the Restatement undertaking is well on its way the present writer hopes
that either the American Law Institute or the Carnegie Corporation will soon see fit
to do something toward the very important task of carrying out the two pertinent
suggestions made a quarter of a century ago by Dr. Redlich.
GEOE L. C v t h a
t Professor of Law, New York University, School of Lalw.
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THE LAW OF TREATIEs; BRITISH PRACTICE AND OPINIONS. By Arnold D. McNair.
New York: Columbia University Press. 1938. pp. xxix, 578. $7.50.
For many decades Moore's Digest has been the classic assembly and classification
of data concerning international law doctrine as applied to specific cases, in many
respects showing how custom has solidified into law. It did much to lift that doctrine
from the pages of publicists and to demonstrate its practicality. But its scope was
limited in great measure to such occasions as were reflected in the papers and docu-
ments of the United States.
To remedy this limitation, a proposal was circulated some years since, urging dis-
tinguished legalists in various countries to attempt to do in their countries what
Judge Moore had done in this, in so far as their foreign offices would permit use of
documents not already public in addition to those previously in print. The volume
which is here reviewed is the first fruit of this proposal and, albeit in a circumscribed
field, contributes much clarification to the subject. It deals merely with the attitude
of the British toward treaties, but within its scope it is an excellent work worthy of
the high reputation of its distinguished author.
Under the four general headings of the conclusion of treaties, their interpretation,
their operation, and their termination, there have been assembled in logical sequences,
data from British command papers, parliamentary records, foreign officer records,
and law officer reports, as well as from court decisions. The ramifications are so
many and the details so thoroughly brought forward in a spirit of full documentation,
that a reviewer is manifestly unable to cover the scope of the entire work. Selection
will indicate some examples of its character and significance.
In the United States, ratification of a treaty by the Senate makes it "the supreme
law of the land" [e.g., Missouri v. Holland, 252 U. S. 416 (1920)], but we find in
some instances in Britain, as in the case of the Parlement Beige,' that subsequent
legislation is necessary before existing law is changed, that the treaty alone cannot
do it. The reason of course may be that in America a treaty takes effect only by
ratification by elected officials, and in England (if Dr. McNair be right) a treaty or
agreement may be effective even without ratification, providing it does not cede
territory.
In the United States, the "law" thus established by a treaty may be altered by
later legislation [ex parte Larrucea, 249 Fed. 981 (S. D. Cal. 1917)]; in Great
Britain, however, there is an inclination to feel that an established treaty is "the
governing factor" until it expires, and that a later treaty cannot alter it (McNair,
p. 118) as it could in the United States of course.
The discussion of article 18 of the Covenant of the League is particularly inter-
esting. It provides for registration of certain kinds of treaties with the League and
implies they cannot be effective until so registered. Its purpose of course was
publicity. (McNair, pp. 154 ff.) But a treaty is concluded to be effective as of date
of signing, as of date of ratification, or as of some future date, and the effective date
comes and goes before the treaty has been "registered" in Geneva. "It is difficult,"
says the author, "to escape the view that non-registration is a fatal defect and affects
the essential validity of the treaty." England returned Weihaiwei to China when
ratifications were exchanged October 1, 1930, although the Convention was not
registered until February 6, 1931. When Professor Hyde cites this and other cases
similar, Dr. McNair replies: "It is not impossible that contracting parties should
provisionally agree among themselves to act as if a treaty signed by them were in
force."
1. L. R. 4 P. & D. 129 (1879).
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In spite of the fact that the publishers have circulated with this volume a very
deprecatory "flyer" dealing mainly with the limitations of the hook, we feel inclined
to approve it as a useful compilation of evidence and a convenient bit for occasional
casual brousing. Of course, the data here represented does lean very heavily upon the
opinions of the law officers given in past ages, not necessarily the same as future
opinions will be on which British officials will act. Yet that is little in the way of a
deficiency. Even court opinions have been reversed and legislation has been changed.
Indeed, the present reviewer is more inclined to count on the essential conservative
habits of English officers and therefore on the final value of this volume, than the
publishers themselves. Were he not so inclined, he would not have had its title
printed on a page above a reference to John Bassett Moore's work.
ELraIr=G CoLBYt
EQUALITY AND THE LAW. By Louis A. Warsoff. New York: Liveright Publishing
Corporation. 1938. pp. x, 324. $3.00.
Mr. Warsoff proceeds, in this somewhat prosaic book, on the assumption that
natural equality lies at the root of our Constitution. It is his contention, for this
reader painfully arrived at, that the doctrine of equality has been prostituted unduly
to protect property rights. The wonder is, not that this has taken place, but that
the use of "due process", in the form of "freedom of contract" to protect proparty,
has met such successful resistance.
Mr. Warsoff's book is divided into two parts. Most of the first part is a con-
sideration of the history of the Fourteenth Amendment; and the second part is
given over to an attempt at discovering and assessing the application of the "equal
protection" clause.
Mir. Warsoff is fairly conversant with most of the literature on the Fourteenth
Amendment. And, on the whole-,the early part of his book is a fair recital 6f its
paternity. It is one, however, that can be found in any really good text on American
History. I find myself, therefore, unable to find any good reason for such patient
devotion to a field, already so well traversed. Nothing new, startling or brilliant
rescues some 100 pages from this doubt. Accuracy is hardly served by the amateur
dramatics of such statement as: "the shot that killed Abraham Lincoln gave birth
to the Fourteenth Amendment" (p. 50). After the Introduction to Kendrick's "Jour-
nal", 1 there is scarcely longer any need for pen-portraits, somewhat in the Bowers
manner, of the Reconstruction leaders. Evidence is not wanting that, among other
reasons for the drafting of the Fourteenth Amendment, were the doubts concerning
the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Bill.
The thesis of the last half of the book is the charge that the Supreme Court has
failed to give precise definition to the term equality. This failure, it is alleged,
results from a "conscious refusal" on the part of the Court (p. 158). The charge
does not seem susceptible of proof. And even if it were, it is difficult to discern,
nor is Mr. Warsoff helpful here, how, in an expanding industrial society, definite
shape and contour can be given to so universal a term. Certainly neither historians
nor philosophers have rescued it from vagueness.
Mr. Warsoff seems perfectly at home in his discussion of court cases. Yet he can
t Major, Infantry, U. S. Army.
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write that the Slaughter House Cases2 "have become something practitioners cite but
do not read." (p. 15). Why they should cite them at all escapes me. But it simply
is not accurate to say that, in these cases, that "violation of due process was little
argued before the Court" (p. 191). A recent historian, for instance, has written of
Mr. ex-Justice Campbell, who first argued the cases, that he "first discovered the
possibilities lurking within the due process clause".3 In fact if Mr. Warsoff's con-
tention that "business interests ... confined their attacks ... to bombardment of
the Slaughter House Cases," (p. 200) holds any meaning, it is because the positions
of Campbell and Field and Brody made it possible.
Mr. Warsoff hurriedly crowds into the last part of his book an analysis of cases
under the heading Laissez-faire; and he manages in a chapter entitled The Last
Four Years, to write brief notes on more recent cases. Here again, I think, he fails
sufficiently to make clear that two doctrines were vigorously quarreling "freedom of
contract" and "police power." The temporary victory of the first is not altogether
to be divorced from nineteenth century philosophy. Even judges do not write in a
vacuum. If this were made more sharply clear, then from much of Mr. Warsoff's
criticism of the courts-particularly in respect of social and labor questions; to his
preference for Holmeses rather than Pitneys on the bench-I can enter no dissent.
FRANcis DOWNINo
MR. JUSTicE HOLMES AND THE SUPREME CouRT. By Felix Frankfurter. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press. 1938. pp. 139. $1.50.
This compact volume is not only a eulogy of the beloved Justice Holmes and an
estimate of the greatness of his opinions, but an inquiry into the nature of the judicial
process as seen through his eyes. In the three chapters which compose the book, the
former Harvard professor concerns himself with the great jurist's attitude toward the
police power, civil rights, and the federal system.
Justice'Holmes, as Frankfurter ably shows, is by far the most interesting personal-
ity in modem law. The freshness of his creations, the grasp of history and social
economics which they evince, the singularity of his vigorous old age have combined
to justify conferring that title upon him. His judicial opinions unite the greatest
intellection with the least effort. The qualities of clarity and brevity which they
exhibit very often stamp them with the label of literature as well as law. Their
clever attack, hidden implications, and varied rhythm bring joy to those who seek life
in legal codes. Almost all of his opinions are as new, seasonable, and vivid as when
they were written.
Few men, however, and certainly not Justice Frankfurter, will maintain that
Holmes was the greatest judge on the Supreme Court bench. Marshall and Taney,
and others, perhaps, surpass him. Nonetheless, he was probably the -most utterly
human of the great jurists who have served this country.
It is almost a maxim of our law that Justice Holmes' dissents of yesterday are
the laws of today. In recent years his method of judicial limitation, long neglected
by the majority of the Court, has been vindicated. As Frankfurter points out, he
tolerated legislative limitation on property but not on civil liberty, for he deemed
2. 16 Wall. 36 (1873).
3. HAjmmTo, THE CONSTInON REcoNsiDERm (1938) XI. See also the essay "Due
Process of Law" id at 166 ff.
t Professor of History, Fordham University.
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the right of free expression to be fundamental. His consciousness of the problems
of the down-and-out naturally affected his opinions as to the validity of legislative
measures designed to attain industrial well-being. But he was also willing to ranction
experimental legislation of which he did not personally approve, because he was
always reluctant to invalidate state statutes. The Supreme Court of Justice Hughes
has consistently followed Holmes' doctrine in regard to civil rights, and; since 1936,
seems to have adopted, his attitude toward social welfare legislation.
It seems fitting and significant that the foremost scholar on recent Supreme Court
history, whose profound legal knowledge and whose concept of the law as a vital
and dynamic force made him the logical choice to carry on the liberal tradition of
Cardozo and Holmes, should be the author of this volume. Justice Frankfurter, like
the famed jurist of whom he writes, has a way of saying little and making every
word count. In this volume, indeed, he reveals a mind as sharp and social as that
of Holmes himself. The only criticism of his work, which this reviewer feels justi-
fied in putting forth, is that Frankfurter tends to set Holmes up a bit too highly
on the pedestal of tolerance and rationality, rather than to consider him merely as
a mortal with liberal leanings.
GEoncn A. W nrj
LAWvaRs AND THE PROMOTION OF JUSTICE. By Esther Lucille Brown. New York:
Russell Sage Foundation. 1938. pp. 302. $1.00.
This book is one of a series being issued by the Russell Sage Foundation which
deals with the status of various professions or quasi-professions in the United States.
Previous volumes have been concerned with social work, engineering, nursing and
medicine. A statement in the book preceding the title page says among other things:
"Publication under the imprint of the Foundation does not imply agreement by
the organization or its members with opinions or interpretations of authors. It does
imply that care has been taken that the research on which a book is based has been
thoroughly done." The present volume which considers lawyers and the ad-ini-
tration of justice generally, fairly meets the second implication. It gives every evi-
dence of thoroughness and care in the assembly of materials and data. It covers a
wide range of related topics, among them early developments in legal education,
number of schools and students, full-time and part-time schools, approved and un-
approved schools, curriculum, bar examinations, national associations, number of law-
yers, their incomes, weaknesses in the administration of justice, and new trends in
the promotion of justice.
The author has gone to authoritative sources for her data, such as publications of
the Carnegie Foundation dealing with legal education, reports of the American Bar
Association and of the Association of American Law Schools, law review articles
and various surveys which have been made of the legal profession.
While one will not agree perhaps with all of her conclusions, her approach to the
topics discussed in many of which obviously there is room for varying viewpoints,
is a fair and judicial one. Moreover, for one who is not trained in the law she dis-
plays remarkable ability to grasp and appraise accurately the facts and data bearing
on the professional problems considered.
The book is well written. It can be read with profit by law teachers, bar exam-
iners, members of committees on character, and lawyers generally who are interested
t Western Reserve University, Department of Political Science.
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in legal education as well as in the improvement of our professional standards and
out look. At the same time it will serve as a convenient source of ready reference
to much scattered but important material bearing on education and training for the
profession of law.
IGNATIUS M. WILKINSoNf
t Dean, Fordham University, School of Law.
